This paper compares the roles classical and intuitionistic logic play in restricting the free use of truth principles in arithmetic. We consider fifteen of the most commonly used axiomatic principles of truth and classify every subset of them as either consistent or inconsistent over a weak purely intuitionistic theory of truth.
Introduction
There have been many proposals regarding how one may overcome the paradoxes induced by the liar sentence and its variants to obtain consistent axiomatic theories of truth. Feferman [2] observes three possible routes towards consistency. These involve restrictions of language, logic, or truth principles. An example of the first direction is Tarski's hierarchy of truth, formalised, for example, in Feferman [3] and Halbach [5] . Theories involving only the second restriction require the adoption of logics based on more than two truth values, partial logics or paraconsistent logics. Feferman, however, rejects the use of non-standard logics, i.e. logics other than classical or intuitionistic logic, as in these logics "nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning can be carried out" [2, p. 95] . The third direction is exemplified by the work of Friedman and Sheard [4] . The naive notion of truth is removed in favour of twelve principles, referred to as Optional Axioms, each conveying some desirable property of truth. These include direct weakenings of the Tarskian bi-conditional in the form of one direction of the equivalence or rules of inference, axioms for truth repetition and deletion, axioms ensuring commutation between quantifiers and the truth predicate, and axioms of truth completeness and consistency (see table 1 below for the complete list of axioms considered). All subsets of the twelve principles were characterised as either consistent or inconsistent over a classical base theory of truth, the upshot being nine maximal consistent subsets of the Optional Axioms (see theorem 3.2 below). A proof-theoretic analysis of the nine maximal consistent theories was carried out by the present authors in [8] .
The aim of this paper is to investigate the role classical logic plays in restricting the free use of these truth principles. In [4] a classical base theory, Base T , is used incorporating a truth predicate whose underlying logic is also classical, i.e. Base T T( A ∨ ¬A ) for every sentence A where A denotes the Gödel number of A. We will carry out the Friedman-Sheard programme in a purely intuitionistic environment making use of a base theory in which neither the underlying logic nor the logic of the truth predicate is declared classical. Friedman and Sheard proved a number of inconsistency results regarding subsets of the Optional Axioms; however, the majority of these proofs make use of classical principles inherent in the base theory and it is not immediate that they can be eliminated. Furthermore, the following four principles are all equivalent over the classical base theory used by the authors, when stated for arbitrary sentences A and B of L T .
T( A ) ∨ T( ¬A ), ¬T( A ) → T( ¬A ),

T( A ∨ B ) → T( A ) ∨ T( B ), (T( A ) → T( B )) → T( A → B ).
Using the intuitionistic base theory proposed here the first axiom implies the remaining three and the second is a consequence of the fourth, but these appear to be the only (non-classical) logical dependencies between them: to deduce the first from the second or fourth, one requires classical logic and to deduce the first from the third a classical truth predicate is required.
Intuitionistic logic
There are many ways to formulate first-order intuitionistic predicate calculus. We shall make use of the Hilbert-style formulation presented in, for example, [10, §2.4] . The basic logical connectives are ∧, ∨ and →; with ⊥ a logical constant. Negation is considered defined: ¬A abbreviates the implication A → ⊥. The rules of inference are modus ponens and generalisation.
Let L denote the basic language of arithmetic and L T the language L augmented with a unary predicate symbol T. We will make use of models of intuitionistic logic, in particular intuitionistic Kripke ω-structures for L T , which are introduced below. N denotes the standard model of arithmetic. We write T u for the set {x : u, x ∈ T M }. W M is referred to as the carrier of M, w ∈ W M as a world of M, and T w as the interpretation of truth at w.
A Kripke ω-structure determines a satisfaction relation, u A, for u ∈ W M and sentences A in L T defined as follows.
1. w ⊥ does not hold for any w ∈ W M , 2. w R(t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ) iff R(t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ) is true in N, where R is an n-ary predicate symbol in L for a primitive recursive relation and t 0 , . . . , t n−1 are closed terms of L, 7. w ∃xA(x) iff there is an n ∈ N such that w A(n), 8 . w ∀xA(x) iff for every u ≥ w and every n ∈ N, u A(n).
We may write M to emphasise the relation is defined with respect to M and drop the subscript M from W M and T M when M is clear from the context. If M is an intuitionistic Kripke ω-structure and A is a sentence of L T , M models A, written M |= A, if w A for every w ∈ W M .
An intuitionistic Kripke ω-structure M = W M , ≤ M , T M is a classical (ω-)model if its universe has at most one element, i.e. |W M | = 1. In that case M is determined by T w where w ∈ W M and T M = {w} × T w .
Intuitionistic first-order predicate calculus (IPC) is sound with respect to the class of intuitionistic Kripke ω-structures, since it is sound with respect to all Kripke structures (see, for example, [6, 10] ).
We may assume L contains a function symbol for every primitive recursive function and that we have some primitive recursive Gödel coding,
. of L T -formulae. If f is a primitive recursive function we denote by f . its corresponding symbol in L. Let HA denote the theory of Heyting arithmetic, the intuitionistic theory with the usual Peano axioms for successor and multiplication, defining axioms for every primitive recursive function and the schema of induction for all formulae in its language. Denote by HA T the theory HA formulated in the language L T , that is, with the induction schema extended to include all formulae of L T . We say a theory S has the disjunction property if, whenever S A ∨ B, either S A or S B holds, and has the existence property if whenever S ∃xA(x) there is a term t such that S A(t). It is well known that HA has both the disjunction and existence property (see, for example [10, chap. 3, thm. 5.10] ). This also holds for HA T ; the presence of the truth predicate has no effect on the proof.
To each logical connective * is associated a primitive recursive function symbol * . in L representing it for sentences: that is, for all sentences A, B in L T , ( A * . B ) = A * B , for * each of ∧, ∨, →; and that if either x or y is not the code of a sentence of L T , x * . y = 0 =1 , wheren denotes the n-th numeral. ¬ . x abbreviates x → . ⊥ .
It will be necessary to quantify over codes of L T sentences and formulae of L T with at most one free variable and thus we introduce the following notation. Let Sent L (x) denote the formal predicate which expresses 'x is the code of a sentence of L ' and let subn(m, n) denote the primitive recursive function such that subn( A(x) , n) = A(n) if A is a formula of L T with at most x free. If m is not the code of a sentence with at most one free variable subn(m, n) = 0 =1 . We then introduce the following abbreviations.
To simplify uses of the function subn we make use of the dot convention for variables, namely, by A(ẋ) we represent the term subn( A(x) , x).
A closer look at the Optional Axioms
We can now define the base theory Base i T over which our analysis takes place. Definition 3.1 Let Base i T denote the theory extending HA T with the additional axioms:
where val i (x) expresses that x is the Gödel number of an intuitionistically valid first-order L T -formula and Ax PRA (x) expresses that x is the Gödel number of a non-logical axiom of primitive recursive arithmetic. Base T is the theory Base i T formulated in classical logic plus the the principles ∀ A (T( A ∨ ¬A )) stating that the underlying logic of the predicate T is classical. [4] . E. T-Intro, T-Elim, T-Del, T-Cons, ¬T-Intro, ∀-Inf.
H. T-Out, T-Rep, T-Elim, T-Del, T-Cons, ¬T-Intro, ∀-Inf.
I. T-Rep, T-Del, T-Elim, ¬T-Elim, ∀-Inf.
We refer the reader interested in the proof-theoretic strength of the above sets of truth principles to [8] where a thorough analysis of the resulting theories is undertaken.
The independence of the connectives under intuitionistic logic naturally provides three further principles of truth to consider, which are presented in table 2. We refer to the principles in tables 1 and 2 as Optional Axioms. The additional axioms listed in table 2 are all equivalent to T-Comp over Base T . Over Base i T , however, T-Comp implies all three and T-Comp(w) is a consequence of →-Inf, but these appear to be the only dependencies between them; to deduce T-Comp from either T-Comp(w) or →-Inf, one requires classical logic and to deduce T-Comp from ∨-Inf a classical truth predicate is required (cf. propositions 3.3 and 3.4 below). The move to intuitionistic logic provides more freedom to express principles of truth without falling into inconsistency. For example, over Base T the principles of truth disjunction and truth existence, ∨-Inf and ∃-Inf respectively, both imply T-Comp and are consistent with a set of Optional Axioms only if T-Comp is. Over Base i T , however, the two principles are consistent with every consistent subset of the Optional Axioms.
It is worth remarking on the use of relativised quantifiers in these axioms, as compared with the unrelativised form of the other Optional Axioms. Stating T-Comp(w) in its unrelativised form, ∀x(¬T(x) → T(¬ . x)), and assuming the simple statement T(x) → Sent LT (x) (which one would want to be consistent with all sets of Optional Axioms) one could obtain ¬T(n) if n is not the code of an L T -sentence, and hence
However, we assumed (x → . y) = 0 =1 if either x or y is not the code of an L T -sentence, so eq. (1) yields T( ⊥ ), and hence, by T-Imp, T( A ) for every L T -sentence A. Not only would this be inconsistent with a large portion of the Optional Axioms, it does not express the intuitive concept behind T-Comp(w), namely that whenever it is inconsistent to state a sentence A is true, ¬A is true. The problem can be resolved by relativising the quantifier to only range over codes of L T -sentences. Perhaps one may also fix the problem by defining x → . y so that it is equal to 0 =1 if y is not the code of a sentence, but equal to 0 =0 if x is not the code of a sentence. If stated for non-sentences, T-Comp(w) and T-Comp would then hold vacuously, but this will only cause to complicate matters later where we must forever perform a case distinction in the back of our minds when utilising → . . A similar situation arises when considering the axiom →-Inf.
In the end, the change is purely cosmetic and so we pick the relativised form which provides less opportunity for problems in the long term. Before we continue it is worth noting that this issue does not arise for T-Cons (the only other principle making explicit use of negation) which the reader can easily check.
One may reasonably ask whether the principles proposed in table 2 The next proposition shows T-Comp is equivalent over Base T to each Optional Axiom in table 2, so theorem 3.2 can be extended to involve the additional axioms.
is intuitionistically valid, so by the second axiom of Base
Two applications of T-Imp, yields Base
By direct use of the first implication we also see that
is a theorem of Base i T ; but then so is
Thus, Base It is natural to suppose, however, that ∨-Inf, T-Comp(w), →-Inf and TComp are not mutually equivalent when the underlying logic and the logic of the truth predicate is non-classical. Let
and let ≤ be the standard ordering on N. Define three intuitionistic ω-models as follows.
M 0 is a classical model and it is not hard to see that these are all models of Base 
Proof M 0 , as defined above, plays the role of A 0 . Since T-Comp(w) is a consequence of →-Inf over Base i T , we deduce A 0 |= ¬(→-Inf). A suitable model A 1 can be obtained from M 1 by stratifying its construction. Let 2 <ω denote the set of finite binary sequences, let ≤ be the relation 'initial segment of' on 2 <ω , |σ| denote the length of the sequence σ and suppose A 0 , A 1 , . . . is an enumeration of the L T formulae. We will define a theory T σ for every σ ∈ 2 <ω by induction on the length of σ: T := PA where denotes the empty sequence, and for i = 0, 1,
where (¬) i A abbreviates A, if i = 0, and ¬A, if i = 1. Note that T σ forms a consistent classical theory for every σ. For this reason whenever T σ + B C and T σ + ¬B C it must be the case that T σ C. Thus,
it suffices to deduce σ ¬T( A k ) → T( ¬A k ) for every σ ∈ 2 <ω and k ∈ N. Fix some k ∈ N. We show that A k ∈ T τ for every τ extending σ implies (¬A k ) ∈ T σ for every k ∈ N and every σ ∈ 2 <ω by induction on the difference k − |σ|. Case I. k − |σ| ≤ 0. Then |σ| ≥ k and A k has already been seen in the construction of T σ 0 . Therefore, assuming A k ∈ T τ for every τ extending σ, A k must be inconsistent with T ρ for some initial segment of ρ of σ (if k = |σ| take ρ = σ). In that case A k is also inconsistent with T σ , hence T σ ¬A k and so (¬A k ) ∈ T σ . Case II. k − |σ| > 0. Suppose A k ∈ T τ for every τ extending σ. By the induction hypothesis we obtain (¬A k ) ∈ T σ 0 ∩ T σ 1 and thus (¬A k ) ∈ T σ by eq. (2).
The argument for T-Comp(w) can be generalised to also deduce A 1 |= →-Inf: we show by induction on
and hence σ →-Inf. Case I. k + l − |σ| ≤ 0. Therefore |σ| ≥ k + l and the sentences A k and A l have already been encountered in the construction of T σ 0 . Suppose
Furthermore, as T σ forms a consistent theory for every σ ∈ 2 <ω and at no point will T σ be complete, A 1 |= ¬T-Comp. Explicitly, for each σ ∈ 2 <ω let B σ be the formalised consistency statement for T σ (which may be defined since T σ is a finite extension of PA).
Finally, each T σ is classical, so A 1 |= Base c T , whence proposition 3.3 implies also A 1 |= ¬∨-Inf. In sum,
The main theorem
We are now in a position to state the main theorem of this paper, the proof of which constitutes sections 5 to 7. 
If we ignore the additional axioms presented in table 2 for the time being and examine the effect altering the base theory has on the consistent subsets of the Optional Axioms considered by Friedman and Sheard, one might expect some of the inconsistencies between axioms or rules of inference break down; i.e., the maximal consistent sets grow as we weaken the background logic and even spawn new maximal consistent sets of the Optional Axioms. As it happens, perhaps surprisingly, this does not appear to be the case; most of the inconsistencies are derivable without the use of classical principles. It was observed in [4] 
Consistencies
In this section we will establish the consistency of each of the nine sets of Optional Axioms listed in theorem 4. 
Let Th ∞ = {B : ∃n∀k > n A k |= B}. Then Th ∞ is a consistent theory containing D i and closed under T-Intro, ¬T-Intro, T-Elim and ¬T-Elim.
Each of the remaining theories contain ∨-Inf and ∃-Inf but not T-Comp, so we will necessarily need non-classical interpretations of the truth predicates. Moreover, the presence of T-Elim, coupled with either T-Rep or T-Del means the interpretation of the truth predicate shifts from notions of satisfaction in certain classical ω-models to notions of provability in intuitionistic ω-logic (cf. [4, §3] ). In order to then establish the consistency of ∃-Inf and ∨-Inf one needs to show these theories of ω-logic have the disjunction and existence property. This can be achieved by replacing the model constructions in [4] by slash constructions.
If the truth predicate is interpreted as provability, the presence of ∀-Inf ensures this is provability in ω-logic. Hence we make substantial use of derivations in intuitionistic ω-logic; writing S ω A denotes that A is derivable from the axioms and rules of S, which is usually an intuitionistic theory, with the inclusion of the ω-rule in place of generalisation: S ω A(n) for every n implies S ω ∀xA(x). By S A we denote ordinary (finitistic) provability in intuitionistic logic. The next proposition is a corollary of Troelstra and van Dalen's proof of the disjunction and existence property for HA [10, chap. 3, thm. 5.10].
Proposition 5.1 HA T has the disjunction and existence property when formulated in ω-logic.
Consistency of E i
Define a sequence of intuitionistic theories of truth as follows.
A is an L T -sentence and Th n A}.
Provided each Th n is consistent and Th n+1 T( A ) only if Th n A, the theory n Th n is a consistent theory, containing E i . Each Th n is a finitary theory so, by the presence of ∀-Inf in Th n+1 , there are sentences such that Th n+1 T( A ), but Th n A. We prove Th n+1 ω T( A ) if and only if Th n ω A.
The right-to-left implication holds by definition. In order for the left-toright direction to hold, the axioms ∃-Inf and ∨-Inf of Th n+1 necessitate that the disjunction and existence property hold for Th n . The next definition introduces the machinery required to establish this. Definition 5.2 Define a slash relation | n for every n as follows.
1. | n R(s 1 , . . . , s n ) iff R(s 1 , . . . , s n ) is true, where R is an n-ary primitive recursive relation.
2. | 0 T(s) iff s N = A for some sentence A with HA T ω A.
3. | n+1 T(s) iff s N = A for some sentence A with Th n ω A.
6. | n (A → B) iff | n A implies | n B and Th n ω A → B.
7. | n ∀xF (x) iff | n F (m) for every m.
The slash relation allows the freedom to argue semantically, while still holding on to the important information from the theories of interest. This is made clear by the following propositions.
Proof (ii). Argue by induction on n with a subsidiary induction on the length of the deduction Th n A. The main induction hypothesis implies every axiom of Th n−1 is an axiom of Th n and by the above argument (with Th n in place of HA T and Th n+1 in place of Th 0 ) one easily obtains T . If A is also an axiom of HA T but not an instance of the induction schema, | n A naturally holds. As one can verify | n B(0)∧∀x(B(x) → B(x+1)) implies | n B(m) for each m, and so | n ∀x B(x), we also obtain | n A whenever A is an instance of the induction schema in HA T . This leaves only the three axioms of truth present in Base i T to consider. Each theory Th n is closed under modus ponens, thus | n T( A ) and | n T( A → B ) implies | n T( B ), so | n ∀x∀y(T(x) ∧ T(x → . y) → T(y)) is easily obtained.
For the second axiom we observe | n val i (m) holds if and only if m is the code of an intuitionistically valid first-order sentence of L T , and hence | n val i ( B ) implies | n T( B ). As before, this leads us to conclude
Finally, | n Ax PRA (m) holds if and only if m is the code of a non-logical axiom of PRA; whence we deduce | n ∀x(Ax PRA (x) → T(x)).
For the induction step A is derived by the ω-rule or modus ponens. In either case we may conclude | n A by the induction hypothesis and the definition of | n .
Theorem 5.6
The following hold for every n.
(ii). Th n is a consistent theory in ω-logic, (iii). Th n ω A ∨ B implies either Th n ω A or Th n ω B, (iv). Th n ω ∃xA(x) implies Th n ω A(t) for some term t, (v). Th n ω T(s) implies there is a sentence A such that s N = A and Th n ω A.
Proof We prove (i)-(v) simultaneously by main induction on n with a subsidiary induction on the length of the derivation in Th n . We begin with (i) and provide the argument for all n simultaneously. To ease notation it will be convenient to denote HA T by Th −1 . Suppose Th n ω A. Case I. A is an axiom of Th n . This case splits into a number of sub-cases depending on A. 
for every p and q, whence
and thus | n ∀x∀y(T(x ∨ . y) → T(x) ∨ T(y)).
∃-Inf. The induction hypothesis for (iv) and proposition 5.1 imply, for a formula A(x) with at most x free, | n T( A(m) ) holds for some m whenever | n T( ∃xA(x) ). Thus one obtains
and hence | n ∃-Inf.
holds for every formula A with at most x free, so | n ∀-Inf. Let Th ∞ be the (finitary) theory given by Th ∞ A if Th n ω A for some n. Th ∞ can be axiomatised by Base i T , T-Cons, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf, T-Del plus {T( A ) : ∃n Th n A}. Corollary 5.7 implies Th ∞ is closed under T-Elim and T-Intro. As we observed earlier, closure under ¬T-Intro is a consequence of T-Intro and T-Cons, so Th ∞ contains E i . Therefore, if E i A there exists an n such that | n A holds, so E i is consistent.
Consistency of F i
The similarity between F i and E i inspires us to define a sequence of intuitionistic theories
A is an L T -sentence and Th n A}, and attempt to prove Th n+1 ω T( A ) if and only if Th n ω A for every sentence A. In order to establish this we must first show that Th n has the disjunction and the existence property. We can use the same slash relation | n as before adjusted to refer to Th n ; explicitly, | n is defined as in definition 5.2 with clauses 3 and 6 replaced by 3. | n+1 T(s) iff s N = A for some sentence A and Th n ω A;
Proposition 5.8 For every n ∈ N, Th n is a consistent theory. Moreover, the classical L T -structure N, N is a model of Th n .
Proof Each Th n is a sub-theory of A i , which is modelled by N, N .
The following two lemmata can be proved using the same arguments as the previous section. Again we let Th −1 = HA T .
Lemma 5.9 For every n ≥ 0, Th n−1 ω A implies Th n ω A ∧ T( A ).
Lemma 5.10 | n A implies Th n ω A.
Theorem 5.11
The following hold for every n,
(ii). Th n has the disjunction and existence property, (iii). Th n ω T( A ) implies Th n ω A.
Proof In contrast to E i , here one looks to establish | n T-Comp(w) in place of | n T-Cons. 1 To see that T-Comp(w) is slashed note that, by the definition of | n , | n ¬T( B ) entails Th n ω ¬T( B ), but the latter is ruled out by proposition 5.8. Thus | n T-Comp(w) holds vacuously.
(ii) is now a consequence of (i) and lemma 5.10; while (iii) is a consequence of (i) and lemma 5.9.
Let Th ∞ be the theory extending Base i T by T-Del, T-Comp(w), ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf and {T( A ) : ∃n Th n A}. Th ∞ is consistent and closed under T-Intro and T-Elim. It is also closed under ¬T-Elim vacuously, since N, N |= Th ∞ and so Th ∞ ¬T( A ) never occurs. Therefore F i is a sub-theory of Th ∞ and so is consistent.
Consistency of G i
We would like to first explore the connection between T-In and T-Elim as this marks a significant change from the classical setting. The classical inconsistency between T-In and T-Elim arises when analysing the consequences of the liar sentence, B ↔ ¬T( B ) (that is, B ↔ (T( B ) → ⊥)). T-In implies B → T( B ), so B → ⊥ and so ¬¬T( B ). Arguing classically, one may remove the double negation to obtain T( B ) and thus derive B by T-Elim, contradicting ¬B from earlier. If one were arguing within intuitionistic logic though, there would be no means to pass from ¬¬T( B ) to T( B ), so the contradiction cannot be achieved. However,
for any sentence A of L T , since ¬B → (B → A) is intuitionistically valid, and Base 
Our first attempt to manage eqs. (3) and (4) will see us mimic the techniques of the preceding sections to obtain a sequence S i (for i ∈ N) of theories each containing T-In. Defining a suitable slash relation will provide an elegant means to show each S i is consistent, has the disjunction and existence property and
Moreover, eq. (5) and the presence of T-In in S i ensures S i+1 ⊆ S i , whence we will obtain n S n , a consistent theory containing T-In, ∨-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∀-Inf, T-Comp(w) and closed under T-Elim, T-Intro and ¬T-Elim. Although this method does not incorporate the axiom →-Inf it will provide the motivation for the second approach which does.
Define for each n ∈ N an intuitionistic theory S n by
A is an L T -sentence and S n A}.
Let S denote the theory whose axioms are given by Ax( S) = {A : A is a sentence of L T and ∀n S n ω A}.
The set Ax( S) is already deductively closed, that is, if S A and
A is an L T -sentence, ∀n S n ω A and so A ∈ Ax( S). We begin with the following observations.
Lemma 5.12 For every n ∈ N, S n ω A implies S n+1 ω T( A ).
Proof We proceed by transfinite induction on the length of the deduction S n ω A. If no applications of the ω-rule were utilised, S n A and so T( A ) is an axiom of S n+1 . Otherwise a mixture of the induction hypothesis, ω-rule in S n+1 and ∀-Inf imply the result.
Lemma 5.13 For each n, S n+1 ⊆ S n .
Proof It suffices to show each axiom of S n+1 of the form T( A ) is derivable in S n . But if T( A ) is such an axiom, S n A by definition and T-In entails S n T( A ).
Definition 5.14 For each n define a slash relation || n as follows.
The significant difference between || n and | n as given in definition 5.2 is the behaviour of the base case, n = 0. In a similar manner to before we may then deduce the following.
Lemma 5.15 For every n ∈ N, || n A implies S n ω A.
Proposition 5.16 For every n ∈ N,
(ii). S n has the disjunction and existence property (in ω-logic).
Proof By induction on n. T-In. Suppose || n A for some A. Lemma 5.15 implies S n ω A and by lemma 5.13 we obtain S m ω A; whence || n T( A ).
T-Comp(w). || n ¬T( A ) entails S n ω ¬T( A ) and hence S 0 ω ¬T( A ) by lemma 5.13, which contradicts the consistency of S 0 implied by the induction hypothesis for n = 0. Therefore || n T-Comp(w) holds vacuously.
∨-Inf. Suppose || n T( A∨B ). Then S m ω A∨B and hence, by the induction hypothesis for (ii), either S m ω A or S m ω B, so || n T( A ) ∨ T( B ).
∃-Inf. Suppose || n T( ∃x A(x) ). Then S m ω ∃xA(x) and hence, by the induction hypothesis, there is a k ∈ N for which S m ω A(k), so || n ∃x T( A(ẋ) ).
∀-Inf. Suppose || n ∀x T( A(ẋ) ). Then || n T( A(k)) ) for every k ∈ N and so S m ω A(k) for every k. Thus S m ω ∀xA(x) and || n T( ∀xA(x) ).
In the induction step we argue according to the last logical rule applied. All cases are, however, standard and identical to the proof of theorem 5.6.
(ii) is an immediate consequence of lemma 5.15 and (i).
Proposition 5.16 and lemma 5.12 imply eq. (5) as desired. We may thus conclude S, and so G i without →-Inf, is a consistent theory.
Theorem 5.17 (i). S is consistent, (ii). S T-In
(iii). S is closed under T-Intro, T-Elim and ¬T-Elim.
Proof || n ⊥ never holds by clause 1, so (i) is a consequence of proposition 5.16 (i).
(ii) holds because all the axioms listed belong to the theory S n for every n.
(iii). Closure under T-Intro is obvious because of the presence of T-In in S. If S T( A ), the previous proposition implies || n T( A ) holds for every n, thus, by the definition of || n , S n ω A for every n, and so S A. Therefore S is closed under T-Elim. Closure under ¬T-Elim is a consequence of T-Comp(w) and T-Elim.
Corollary 5.18
The theory G i without →-Inf is consistent.
Proof G i without →-Inf is a sub-theory of S, and hence consistent by theorem 5.17.
Had we attempted to incorporate →-Inf into the development of S, we would have required the truth predicate to be interpreted by notions closer to satisfaction and validity than provability. Assuming →-Inf is an axiom of S n+1 , || n+1 (→-Inf) holds if and only if, for all sentences A, B,
The solution will be to replace the interpretation of truth at each step by validity in a certain Kripke structure A n . One naturally requires, amongst other things, the following criteria to be satisfied.
• A n |= A ∨ B implies A n |= A or A n |= B;
• A n |= ∃xA(x) implies A n |= A(t) for some term t;
Such criteria are often associated with classical models, but as theorem 5.20 below shows, there are non-classical L T -structures which satisfy them. Let be the reverse ordering on the natural numbers and define T 0 = {0} × N and A 0 = {0}, , T 0 . A 0 is the 'everything is true' model used to verify A i . Assuming A n and T n are already defined, let
Let T = n T n . It should be clear that the set T can safely replace T n in the definition of A n . We claim the following. a) A n is an intuitionistic Kripke ω-model for every n.
b) The theory Th G ∞ := {B : ∀n A n |= B} is a consistent theory containing G i .
To deduce a) it is sufficient to show the persistency condition holds for A n . However, for every m ≤ n,
Thus, A n |= A entails A m |= A for every m ≤ n, whence {x : n + 1, x ∈ T} ⊆ {x : n, x ∈ T} for every n, as required. Th 
it suffices to show m A implies m T( A ), so suppose m A. By persistency n A, and hence m T( A ), as desired. Thus k A entails k T( A ) for every k ≤ m, so m A → T( A ). (iv). If m T( ∃xA(x) ) we observe n A(k) for some k ∈ N, whence m T( A(k) ) and so m ∃x T ( A(ẋ) ). By the induction hypothesis we obtain m ∃-Inf.
(v). Since n A(k) for every k ∈ N implies n ∀x A(x), the induction hypothesis entails m ∀-Inf.
(
for every k ≤ m, and so k A implies k B for every k ≤ n by definition. Hence n A → B, so m T( A → B ) and we may conclude m →-Inf.
Combining proposition 5.19 with eq. (6) we obtain
On the other hand, A n |= Base i T , so A n |= S n .
Theorem 5.20 G i is a consistent theory.
Proof We show G i A implies
A n |= A for every n ∈ N.
The preceding remarks verify this for the axioms of G i and if A was derived via a logical rule, eq. (8) follows from the induction hypothesis. Moreover, applications of T-Intro in G i are trivialised by T-In. Suppose G i A was a result of T-Elim. Then G i T( A ) and, by the induction hypothesis, A n |= T( A ) for every n ∈ N. So n + 1 T( A ), n A and hence A n |= A for every n ∈ N as required. There is nothing to check for ¬T-Elim since if G i ¬T( A ), the induction hypothesis yields A 0 |= ¬T( A ), contradicting the choice of A 0 . 
Consistency of H
T , so
Th ω A implies M |= A, whence d) holds. This leaves a), which we also need to hold when Th is formulated with the ω-rule (not simply as a finite theory) so as to also accommodate ∀-Inf. We introduce a further slash relation | which is defined as | 0 given in definition 5.2 but with clauses 2 and 6 replaced by ∀-Inf. As Th is formulated in ω-logic, we have
and hence M |= ∀-Inf.
T-Del. A consequence of T-Out, above.
T-Cons. Since M |= Th, Th is consistent, and so M |= T-Cons.
∨-Inf. Follows from lemma 5.22:
and hence M |= ∨-Inf.
∃-Inf. Also follows from lemma 5.22:
and so M |= ∃-Inf. 
Consistency of I i
We will construct a model for I i based on M above. I i contains T-Comp(w) and ∨-Inf, but is inconsistent with T-Comp, thus a model for I i must necessarily be non-classical as opposed to just having a non-classical interpretation for the truth predicate as was the case with H i . We will deal with T-Comp(w) in a similar manner to G i by ensuring no world satisfies a sentence of the form ¬T( A ). Before this, however, we consider the sub-theory of I i without the axiom T-Comp(w). Define Th to be the theory extending Proof The first part is an immediate consequence of proposition 5.23, whence
The final implication follows on account of Th being a sub-theory of Th.
As the classical structure N, N also forms a model of Th, Th is vacuously closed under ¬T-Elim and we may establish the consistency of the subtheory of I i without the axiom T-Comp(w). T-Del.
∀-Inf. Holds since the interpretation of truth at 1 (and also at 0) is closed under ω-logic.
∨-Inf. 1 ∨-Inf because Th has the disjunction property.
∃-Inf. 1 ∃-Inf since Th has the existence property.
For the induction step we assume Th ω B is derived via modus ponens. The induction hypothesis yields A |= A ∧ (A → B) for some sentence A, from which we may readily deduce A |= B. This is also the case for an application of the ω-rule and any other rule of inference in the derivation.
Due to the choice of A, 0 T( B ) for every sentence B, so A |= ¬T( B ) never holds. Thus A |= T-Comp(w) and A is a model of I i .
Theorem 5.28 A |= I i , and so I i is consistent.
Proof Let Th
# denote the theory given by Th together with T-Comp(w), that is, Th # denotes the theory
We will prove a) Th 
Inconsistencies
Having shown the consistency of each of the nine theories listed in theorem 4.1, we now turn to the task of showing every subset of the Optional Axioms not contained in one of the theories is inconsistent over Base i T . For some subsets the arguments presented in [4] are valid intuitionistically and so no further work is required to deduce their inconsistency. However, many of the derivations do make use of the classical principles inherent in Base T and it is not obvious whether or not these can be dispensed with. As we shall see, all but one of the classical inconsistencies has a purely intuitionistic proof. It is important to note that the usual diagonal argument used to construct the liar sentence and its variants may be carried out in purely intuitionistic logic; the argument requires no classical principles. We will abuse notation for the remainder of the section and write T(A) in place of T( A ).
Let B denote the liar sentence; that is, B ↔ ¬T(B). Note 
S T(T(A) → A) → T(A).
Proof By the diagonal lemma pick a sentence F such that
An application of T-Intro yields
We now argue informally within S. Assume A) ), so T(F ) by eq. (10), and so T(A). Thus,
T(F → A).
T-Rep implies T(T(F →
whence a further application of T-Intro entails
Now assume, within S, T(T(A) → A). Then we deduce 
T(T(F →
A
is, S T(T(A) → A) → T(A).
It is worth remarking that had we assumed the axiom T-Rep was given in its quantified form, the above proof may be generalised to deduce, under the same assumptions,
In place of the diagonal lemma one makes use of its parametrised form which allows the construction of a formula F (x) such that
As the sentence A does not occur outside the scope of the truth predicate in the proof of lemma 6.2, the remainder of the proof may proceed as before. Notice that the parametrised form of T-Intro follows from the nonparametrised form due to the fact that Base i T T( ∀x A(x) ) → T( A(ẋ) ), and thus this form is available for use in the proof.
The remaining inconsistency is now easily verified. 
Completing the proof of the main theorem
We can now complete the proof of theorem 4.1. Section 5 shows that each of the nine theories is consistent and section 6 provides the necessary results to see they are maximally so. All that remains is to show these are the only maximal consistent subsets of the Optional Axioms. Let OA c denote the set of classical Optional Axioms, excluding ∃-Inf, and let OA i be the set of axioms {∃-Inf, ∨-Inf, T-Comp(w), →-Inf}. Suppose, in search of a contradiction, that R is a consistent subset of the Optional Axioms (over Base i T ) which is not a subset of any of the nine theories listed in theorem 4.1. R can be viewed as S 1 ∪S 2 where S 1 ⊆ OA c and S 2 ⊆ OA i . By the combined work of [4, §4] and section 6 we see that S 1 must be a subset of (at least) one of the nine theories A i to I i and the only situation where one may obtain a consistent subset of the Optional Axioms which is not included in the list is if S 2 contains →-Inf and S 1 is a subset of one of F i or I i , or S 2 contains T-Comp(w) and S 1 is a subset of either E i or H i . We thus have two cases to consider based on S 2 , each with a further two sub-cases dealing with the choice of S 1 . Case Ia. S 2 contains →-Inf and S 1 ⊆ F i . Since →-Inf logically implies TComp(w) we may assume, without loss of generality, that S 2 also contains T-Comp(w). Lemma 6.2 entails S 1 does not contain one of T-Elim or T-Del. Without T-Elim, R is a subset of A i ; and without T-Del, R is contained in D i , contradicting the assumption. Case Ib. S 2 contains →-Inf and S 1 ⊆ I i . Again one of T-Del and T-Elim is not contained in S 1 and hence R is contained in either A i or G i . Case IIa. S 2 contains T-Comp(w) and S 1 ⊆ E i . Unless R is a subset of D i , S 1 must contain T-Del. Likewise, to avoid F i (and thus case Ia above), S 1 must contain T-Cons. But then, each of T-Elim, T-Intro and ¬T-Intro is inconsistent with R, and R is a subset of C i . Case IIb. S 2 contains T-Comp(w) and S 1 ⊆ H i . T-Out is inconsistent with T-Comp(w), so S 1 does not contain T-Out. We may assume S 1 contains TRep as otherwise S 1 is a subset of E i and by the previous case, we are done. To avoid I i (and hence case Ib above), S 1 must contain T-Cons or ¬T-Intro; either way R is consistent with T-Cons. So R is consistent with T-Rep, T-Comp(w) and T-Cons and to avoid inconsistency we see that S 1 may not contain T-Del, ¬T-Intro or T-Elim. Thus R is a subset of TRep, T-Comp(w), T-Cons, ∀-Inf, T-Comp, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf, →-Inf, and hence is contained in B i .
Conclusion
With intuitionistic logic we obtain more freedom to assert additional natural principles about truth. The principles ∨-Inf and T-Comp(w), for example, are independent over Base i T but equivalent over the fully classical Base T . Although we still obtain exactly nine maximal consistent sets of the Optional Axioms, more would appear if we allow mixed scenarios, e.g. if the underlying logic of the base theory is classical but the logic of the truth predicate is intuitionistic. For instance, the theory I i of corollary 5.26 may be formulated in classical logic while still maintaining an intuitionistic truth predicate since the models used in the proof of its consistency are all classical. 2 Let us denote this new theory by I c . Due to the presence of classical logic, T-Comp(w) is inconsistent with I c and so I c is not a subset of any of the intuitionistic theories A i -I i . I c , however, maintains the axioms ∨-Inf and ∃-Inf, so nor is it contained in any of Friedman and Sheard's classical theories. Thus I c is a new maximal consistent theory. Likewise theorem 5.24 shows H i can also be consistently formulated in classical logic, again with an intuitionistic truth predicate; let us denote this theory by H c . Note, however, H c does not represent an additional maximal consistent theory as H c extends H i . Furthermore, formulating any theory containing T-Intro in classical logic results in a classical truth predicate and hence in a theory extending Base T . 3 Thus, adding the law of excluded middle to the collection of Optional Axioms and allowing the user to insist upon a theory based on classical logic yields as possible maximal consistent theories A-G, E i -G i , I i , H c , and I c , a total of thirteen theories. Moreover, each theory in the above list contains a subset of OA + which is not contained in any other theory.
Proof That each of these theories is consistent has already been established. This leaves two remaining tasks: show every consistent subset of OA + is contained in one of the thirteen theories; and associate to each theory a unique maximal consistent subset of OA + . For the former it suffices to show every consistent subset of the Optional Axioms not extended by any of the proposed classical theories is inconsistent with the law of excluded middle. To that aim, suppose S is a consistent subset of the Optional Axioms but is not a subset of any of the nine classical theories listed above and suppose, in search of a contradiction, that S is consistent with the law of excluded middle. In particular S must be a subset of one of E i , F i , G i or I i (any other intuitionistic theory is a sub-theory of one of the classical theories in the list), and be inconsistent with the axiom T-Comp. Consider the following facts. The first has already been remarked, b) and c) were proved in proposition 3.3 and d) is immediate. e) is a result of the argument that ∃-Inf implies TComp over Base T .
Combining these facts we see that S cannot contain both T-In and TElim, nor can S contain either T-Comp(w) or →-Inf, as part of the assumptions entail T-Comp is inconsistent with S. This means S must now be a subset of one of E i , F i or G i and, moreover, S must contain at least one of the axioms ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf. But, if S does not contain T-Intro it is also a subset of either H c , I c or A, and if S contains T-Intro, either d) or e) entails that S is consistent with T-Comp, yielding a contradiction.
We now move to the second task, namely associating with each theory in the list a subset of OA + which is unique to that theory. For the theories A-D, E i , F i , G i , H c and I i simply pick the corresponding maximal consistent set given by theorem 4.1. For the remainder, E, F, G and I c , pick the set of Optional Axioms proscribed by theorem 3.2 and add the law of excluded middle.
Another candidate for inclusion in the list of Optional Axioms (and arguably a more natural choice than the excluded middle) is the principle ∀ A T( A∨¬A ) stating that the truth predicate contains classical logic. At first sight, it might appear that this axiom would enable one to construct new maximal consistent theories based on intuitionistic logic while maintaining a classical truth predicate. The next theorem, however, demonstrates one does not obtain any theories not already encountered. Although the addition of T-Class does not create any extra theories of truth, it does allow one to differentiate between the classical theories E-I and the intuitionistic theories E i -I i . In particular, the triple {T-Out, ∨-Inf, T-Class} is inconsistent, but the two sets {T-Out, ∨-Inf} and {T-Out, T-Class} are consistent over Base i T ; they correspond to the theories H c and H respectively. Using only subsets of the original fifteen Optional Axioms and the law of excluded middle, one is unable to differentiate between the two cases.
Theorem 8.3
Allowing the axiom T-Class as an additional Optional Axiom one obtains exactly fourteen maximal consistent theories, whereas allowing both T-Class and the law of excluded middle provides exactly fifteen maximal consistent theories.
Future work
A natural continuation of this project would involve determining the prooftheoretic strength of each of the nine maximal consistent theories listed in theorem 4.1 and, ultimately, each of the fifteen theories described in theorem 8.3. The analogous task for the classical Friedman-Sheard theories was undertaken by the authors in [8] and the proof-theoretic strength of each of the nine theories of truth was determined: the theory A is a conservative extension of PA; B and C each prove the same arithmetical statements as the second-order theory of arithmetical comprehension with full induction, ACA; D (due to Halbach [5] ), G and I are equivalent to ACA + 0 , the theory of arithmetical comprehension augmented with the axiom stating the existence of the ω-Turing jump for every set; E and F are equivalent to the second-order theory of Σ 1 1 dependent choice, Σ 1 1 -DC 0 , which has proof-theoretic ordinal φω0; and H is proof-theoretically equivalent to the theory of one inductive definition (due to Cantini [1] ).
By performing a proof-theoretic analysis on the theories of truth considered in this paper we hope to relate each theory to a familiar theory of mathematics. The theories B i , C i and D i are in fact classical theories (due to the presence of T-Comp and T-Elim) and, as such, are identical to their classical counterparts B, C and D respectively. A i is a proper sub-theory of A and by interpreting T(s) in A i as Sent LT (s), it is clear that A i is a conservative extension of HA. For the purely intuitionistic theories, E i -I i as well as the semi-intuitionistic theories H c and I c , however, the situation is not so straightforward. These theories are not sub-theories of their classical counterparts due to the presence of the axiom ∨-Inf, so the results of [8] do not yield bounds on their proof-theoretic strength.
